Introduction

   Legislative bodies constitute the essence of a republican form of democratic government. The evolution of modern democracies is essentially the transfer of lawmaking authority from an unelected monarch to a body of elected representatives. In large measure, this evolution to popular sovereignty was completed by the time of the founding of the current constitutional order of the United States in 1787 and the entry of Alabama into the federal Union in 1819.

   The role of state legislative institutions is especially important in the context of U.S. federalism as formatted in the national constitution.(1) Powers of the national legislature are restrained theoretically by the U.S. Constitution, which specifies functions of the Congress. However, the document vests a large residuum of political authority with the states and, by implication, a vast array of unspecified powers to state assemblies.

   Because of this important role of legislative institutions in a democratic policy and the existence of extensive powers residing by default in state legislatures, the legislative article of American state constitutions is frequently of major concern during periods of constitutional development. Through the legislative article of its constitution, an American state operationalizes its version of representative government and imposes constitutional restraints upon the exercise of a potentially vast array of powers reserved to the states by the national constitution.

   Alabama is no exception to this generalization about state constitutionalism. From the state's initial constitutional convention at Huntsville in 1819 until today, issues relating to the basic structure, operation and powers of the Alabama legislature have been debated in varying degrees at each major juncture of the state's constitutional history.

Perspective of Alabama's Founders

   The state's original constitution of 1819 created a governmental system in which the legislature was the dominant branch, but simultaneously created a legislative institution which was accountable to the voters via annual elections for state House members and three-year terms for senators.(2) Although the legislature had extensive powers, especially in the area of appointments, and could meet in regular annual sessions, its members faced the constant threat of electoral retaliation. The founders of Alabama empowered the legislature to govern with relatively few legal restraints, but maximized the opportunity for electoral accountability. Legislative authority was limited by popular accountability, not by lengthy and detailed constitutional proscriptions.

   Since 1819, a major theme in the evolution of Alabama's constitution has been an almost steady growth in limitations upon legislative authority via constitutional restraints. Distrust of the legislature, not empowerment of the legislature, has been evident in several constitutional developments since the state's founding. By 1828, there was a political movement in Alabama to replace annual sessions and annual elections.(3) In 1845, voters by a wide margin manifested distrust of both the legislature and the populace by adopting an amendment which created biennial sessions and longer legislative terms (two years for representatives and four years for senators).(4) Newspaper commentary of the time complained of excessive legislation and perpetual electioneering as dual justifications for the amendment.(5)

   During the three decades immediately prior to the Civil War, there were also assertions that the state constitution should impose time limits upon legislative sessions. Some opinion leaders advocated a four-week limit on a regular session to stabilize state law and reduce incessant meddling by legislators in local government affairs.(6) These claims for the need of a time limitation were made at a period when the legislature typically convened during early or middle November and remained in session until the next January or February. Perhaps more important, the length of regular sessions did not change appreciably with the conversion from annual to biennial sessions in 1846. Somewhat surprisingly, the length of regular sessions remained relatively constant during the formative decades of the state's history in the absence of restrictive constitutional language. However, available modes of transportation and the seasonally-related demands of an agricultural economy during the early 1800s may have imposed time limits in a de facto sense upon legislative sessions and eliminated the need for a constitutional mandate to regulate session length.

Civil War And Reconstruction

   When Alabama's leaders desired secession from the federal union in 1861, a state constitutional convention was convened largely for purposes of secession and ratification of the Confederate Constitution.(7) Although this convention restored annual sessions, they were limited to thirty days; legislative powers in the areas of taxation and indebtedness were also circumscribed. For example, no state debt could be incurred unless by a two-thirds vote of the legislature, except for defense purposes, and thelegislature could guarantee no indebtedness by private parties, such as corporations. These new constitutional limitations upon legislative authority were not by-products of secession from the Union, but resulted from growing criticism of the legislature since the 1850s. As early as 1852, the editor of the Montgomery Advertiser described a legislative session of 90 days as "an evil that requires speedy remedy" and characterized the assembly's work product as a "vast bundle of trash" oriented to petty local squabbles.(8)

   Conclusion of the war and attempted reentry into the Union produced constitutional revision in Alabama during 1865. Basically, this convention left in place limitations on the legislature enacted by the secessionist convention of 1861.(9) In 1865 the major issue of contention regarding the legislative article was a dispute over the basis for reapportionment which erupted between delegates from north and south Alabama. This dispute resembled a very similar conflict at the 1819 convention. Delegates from north Alabama preferred a count of only white residents while southern delegates preferred to count all residents for the purposeof allocating seats in the legislature. A victory by north Alabama delegates was short-lived as the Reconstruction Congress soon imposed military rule and enfranchised African-American residents.

   Although there was also a convention in 1867 dominated by scalawags and carpetbaggers, this convention made very few changes in legislative structure and powers.(10) The 1867 meeting was largely for the purpose of placating the Reconstruction Congress and accommodating its demands for full reentry into the Union. Punitive measures against ex-Confederates and the voting rights of African-Americans dominated the meeting which produced a serious schism within the state's GOP.(11)

Post-Reconstruction

   In 1874 George S. Houston, a Democrat, won the governor's office from Republicans on the dual themes of white supremacy and the return of state government to the control of native Alabamians with anti-Unionist sentiments. A secondary theme in his campaign was greater frugality in government and a retrenchment in the scope of government or number of offices created during the Reconstruction period. Democrats in the legislature joined Houston who called for a constitutional convention to restructure state government in a manner which would purge the vestiges of scalawag and carpetbagger influences.(12)

   The resulting 1875 convention produced a lengthy list of severe restrictions upon legislative authority and a legislative article which more than doubled the length of legislative articles in Alabama's previous constitutions.(13) Although Alabamians of the late Twentieth Century focus their efforts at constitutional understanding upon the 1901 document, it is important to remember that many of its features pertaining to the legislative article have their origins in the social and political environment of the 1875 constitutional convention. The 1875 constitution created biennial regular sessions limited to fifty days. It prohibited the enactment of local legislation about a wide variety of subjects, prohibited the state from borrowing money for internal or capital improvements, imposed a reduced legislative salary of $4.00 per diem, limited the scope of taxing authority, and gave the governor control over the legislative agenda during special sessions. Other features in the subsequent legislative article of 1901, such as the governor's power of line-item veto of legislative appropriations and various anti-bribery provisions, also have their origins at this 1875 convocation.

   In spite of the length and complexity of the legislative article developed at the 1875 meeting, other issues, such as school funding, state indebtedness, and property exemptions from court judgments, generated the most extensive and intense political debate.(14) The very restrictive features associated with indebtedness received special attention because of the large amount of credit or endorsed bonds which had been extended to the railroads by the Reconstruction legislature of the late 1860s and early 1870s.

The 1901 Constitution and Progeny

   The roots of Alabama's only constitutional convention in the Twentieth Century are by-products of populism's threat to the established political order of the state and the desire of landed gentry to diminish the electoral clout of African-Americans and poor whites.(15) By this period in Alabama history, distrust of the legislature was universal across the political spectrum. Populists viewed the institution as controlled by landed gentry, railroads and other corporate interests and as harmful to the "pocketbooks" of the common man. Conservatives of the business community feared the potential use of legislative power to interfere with the maintenance and enhancement of extant wealth, if the institution, by chance, fell under the control of populists. Thus, both major political factions of the state viewed the state assembly as deserving of a constitutional "straitjacket."(16)

   The legislative committee of the 1901 convention responded to these pressures as expected. The resulting legislative article was very restrictive of legislative authority. Not only were many of the limitations from 1875 embedded in the 1901 document, but the convention by a narrow margin (67 to 55) instituted the nation's first quadrennial legislative session.(17) Proponents argued that a regular session once every four years would stabilize the law, deter legislative interference with local affairs, and save money. A quadrennial legislative session limited to 50 days was adopted, but this provision resulted in the frequent use of specialsessions. In fact, during the forty-two year history of quadrennial regular sessions (1901-1943), more special sessions were convened than during the previous eighty-two years of statehood.(18)

   The legislative article of the 1901 Constitution also imposed numerous restrictions upon the details of the legislative process. (See Article IV, sections 37-111) For example, each bill, unless an appropriation or revenue bill, or a measure which approves adoption of a Code revision, shall relate to only one subject. A majority of the members of each house constitute a quorum necessary to transact business in that chamber. Each chamber shall adopt its rules of proceedings and shall keep an official journal of its daily proceedings. The journal of each chamber shall record a roll call vote on a measure if requested by 10 percent of the members present. While in session, access to the floor is limited to members and a few individuals, such as the governor, legislative employees, the press, and others extended privileges by a unanimous vote. Bills must be "read" three times and must undergo consideration by a standing committee. Before final approval of a bill in a chamber, the bill must be read verbatim unless two-thirds of a quorum dispenses with the rule. Amendments and conference committee reports must be approved by entering on the journal the names of those for and against the amendment or conference report. Bills for raising revenue must originate in the House and no revenue measure shall be passed during the last five days of a session. Members of the legislature with a personal or private interest in any bill should abstain from voting on the measure and are required to disclose such conflict of interest to the chamber. These restrictions upon legislative process, although enforced in varying degrees, remain in effect.

The Return to Annual Sessions

   Amendment 39 to the 1901 Constitution, adopted in 1939, returned the legislature to biennial sessions to be held during odd-numbered years beginning in 1943. Regular sessions were expanded from fifty to sixty consecutive calendar days and special sessions were limited to thirty consecutive calendar days. The amendment permitted the legislature to meet for an organizational session during January immediately following the November election, but this session was restricted to organizational issues and could not last longer than ten consecutive calendar days. Legislator pay was increased to ten dollars per day while in session; members were also compensated at a rate of $.10 per mile for one round trip to the Capitol from the solon's residence during a legislative session.

   In 1946, voters approved Amendment 57, which restricted the permissible length of regular sessions to thirty-six days, but expanded the maximum length of special sessions from thirty to thirty-six days. However, the language of Amendment 39 which mandated session length in terms of "consecutive calendar" days was deleted, except for the quadrennial organizational session which was still limited to ten "consecutive calendar" days. Amendment 57 maintained the salary and travel allowances permitted by Amendment 39. However, Amendment 57 authorized the legislature to compensate members for non-travel expenses. The latter provision about non-travel expenses said that "such expense allowance shall not be less than the smallest allowance to any other person traveling within the state in the service of the state of Alabama, or any of its agencies, for expenses other than actual expenses for traveling." This language created a minimum amount or "floor" for non-travel allowances, but did not establish a constitutional ceiling. This language operated as the constitutional mechanism for increased compensation for legislators; today, legislators increase their compensation by increasing their non-travel expense allowance.

   In 1976, following the adoption of Amendment 339 in 1975, the Alabama Legislature reinstated the practice of annual regular sessions. However, this amendment injected the ideas of "legislative days" and "calendar days" into constitutional text. This language gave constitutional blessings to institutional behavior which had begun in the late Nineteenth Century. At that time, the legislature redefined a "day" as only a legislative meeting day, not a calendar day. So, although the 1875 Constitution limited regular sessions to fifty days, the session would actually last much longer with the assembly meeting for a few legislative days, then recessing for committee work, and reconvening to use additional legislative days. The Alabama Supreme Court approved of this subterfuge in the decision of Moog. v. Randolph in 1884.(19) Amendment 339 limited regular sessions to 30 legislative days or meeting days of a chamber, but these legislative days must be contained with a period of 105 consecutive calendar days. Special sessions were limited to 12 legislative days within 30 consecutive calendar days. Amendment 339 did not alter provisions about legislative compensation or the provision for an organizational session limited to ten consecutive calendar days.

Local Legislation

   Other recent amendments affecting legislative operations have impacted only local legislation. Amendment 341 clarified requirements for public notification of local bills; prior to action on a local bill, proof and notice of adequate publication of local bills in local newspapers must be provided to the Clerk of the House and Secretary of the Senate and must be attached to the original copy of the local bill. Prior to Amendment 341, Article IV, section 106 of the 1901 constitution required less precision by stating that proof of notification must be "spread upon the journal" of each chamber.

   Additional post-1901 revisions have been necessary to clarify the very definition and scope of local bills as opposed to legislation of statewide application. Amendment 375 was designed to override limitations embedded in Article IV, section 110 of the 1901 document. Section 110 had defined a general law as one which applies to the state as a whole; it defined a local law as one which applies to a political subdivision, but not the whole state. The legislature for many years engaged in a circumvention of constitutional limitations upon local legislation by passing a general bill which contained provisions granting special status or exemptions for particular political subdivisions. A decision of the Alabama Supreme Court in the late 1800s had legitimized this practice by sanctioning passage of a general bill with local application. In 1978, the Alabama Supreme Court in the decision of Peddycoart v. City of Birmingham reversed its earlier position and imposed a strict interpretation of section 110.

   In response to the Peddycoart decision, Amendment 375 was adopted. It redefined a general law to include the state as a whole and "one or more municipalities of the state less than the whole." However, the Amendment permitted enactment of legislation which creates not more than eight categories or classes of cities grouped according to population. General bills of local application as distinguished from a purely local bill may be enacted for each of these eight population categories of cities. The Amendment also declared as constitutional any existing general law of local application which had been rendered unconstitutional by Peddycoart. While Amendment 375 accords some flexibility to the legislature in dealing with the widely varying needs of Alabama's small and large cities, it is obviously a compromise between the rigidity imposed by Peddycoart and the chaos surrounding local legislation prior to Peddycoart. Of course, one result of this amendment was to encourage legislators to introduce even more constitutional amendments which affected only one community; this tactic is currently the principal means by which to circumvent post-Peddycoart developments.

Budget Business and B.I.R.

   Only one amendment since 1901 has had a noticeable impact upon the legislative process in terms of daily operations. Amendment 448, ratified in 1984, was designed to make the two basic appropriation bills the paramount order of business of the regular legislative session. This amendment prohibits the transfer of legislation from a chamber until the Legislature has presented the appropriation bills for the General Fund and the Alabama Special Education Trust Fund to the governor. However, this limitation may be circumvented by the passage of a Budget Isolation Resolution or B.I.R. by three-fifths of a quorum present, provided such resolution is passed immediately proceeding a chamber's consideration of each bill prior to a final vote. The constant use of B.I.R.s prolongs legislative deliberation and, on occasion, permits the will of a majority of less than sixty percent to be thwarted as a minority of more than forty percent prohibits a vote on the bill by failing to pass the accompanying B.I.R. Amendment 448, to date, appears to be pure symbolism and has not resulted in earlier consideration and more timely passage of annual budget bills.

Funding Public Infrastructure

   Other significant amendments of statewide impact enacted since 1901 have affected the scope of legislative power, but not legislative structure or operation as with the aforementioned amendments. Several of the initial amendments (1,12 and 58) to the 1901 constitution gave the legislature greater flexibility to use state credit for public infrastructure. These amendments effectively repealed Article IV, section 93 of the 1901 constitution which imposed an absolute barrier to the use of state indebtedness for "internal improvements" or public infrastructure. The first of these amendments (No. 1) permitted state indebtedness for highways, the second (No. 12) allowed indebtedness for harbors and seaports, and the final amendment in the group (No. 58) added air navigation facilities.

Stability in Miscellaneous Provisions

   Although numerous other limitations upon legislative power and structure are embedded in the document, many features have remained relatively constant since the state's formative years, or were adopted and maintained largely without controversy. For example, the size of the assembly has been almost the same since the 1840s with approximately 100 representatives and 33 senators. This three-to-one ratio of House to Senate members and the use of a bicameral structure (two legislative chambers) have not been seriously challenged during the state's modern history. Other restraints upon legislative power, such as the state constitution's bill of individual rights (Article I, sections 1 to 36), and provisions relating to the alteration of county boundaries, the location of certain institutions of higher learning and the state capital, and special requirements for a supermajority (3/5ths) vote to propose a state constitutional amendment, have likewise not been issues of serious contention during debates about state constitutional reform.

Commentary and Prescription

   Since World War II, three Alabama governors (Folsom, Sr., Brewer, and James), a legislative reform study committee, and a constitutional revision commission have recommended alterations to the 1901 Constitution.(20) Several of their recommendations have pertained to the structure and operation of the Legislature, and some recommendations, such as annual sessions and improvement of facilities, have been implemented. Also, the Citizen's Conference on State Legislatures, a national group which engaged in an extensive, comparative assessment of American state legislatures during the early 1970s, awarded low grades to the Alabama assembly in terms of function, information, accountability, independence and representativeness.(21) More recently, university-based polling data have indicated that the state's electorate also accords relatively low marks to the Legislature.(22) Based upon information and conclusions from these diverse perspectives, there is a well documented need for revision of the legislative provisions in Alabama's Constitution.

   What adjustments are needed in current legislative provisions of the state constitution in order to enhance the operation of the legislature as a functional and accountable body of representative government in the Twenty-first Century? What constitutional adjustments should be made to enhance the public's confidence in the operation and work product of the Legislature? How can the Legislature be structured and empowered to manage its ever growing and complicated workload, while maintaining the public's apparent desire for an amateur or part-time, citizen legislature as opposed to a full-time, professional Congress?

   The following recommendations regarding a reformed legislative article are made in an attempt to address some of these issues. Many of these proposals are modifications of earlier recommendations by various groups.

1. Adopt constitutional provisions which would deal more effectively with two recurring issues of intense self-interest among legislators. These issues are reapportionment and compensation. The Legislature's capacity to manage these issues is reduced because almost every member of the institution may be personally affected by the outcome. Apportionment consumes much time at the beginning of each decade, while compensation is usually a topic at the outset of each quadrennial session.

   With regard to reapportionment, the Legislature should be given a major inducement to adopt a reapportionment plan not later than the conclusion of the first, complete regular session after issuance of the decennial Census data. Failure by the Legislature to meet this deadline should shift responsibility for reapportionment to an eleven-member commission of non-legislators who would be selected by members of the Legislature during the first year of the effected decade (2000, 2010, etc.). Five members would be chosen by the House and an equal number by the Senate. The eleventh member and chairperson would be a joint appointee of the Speaker and Lieutenant Governor. If the Legislature adjourned without enacting a plan or if the plan was subsequently rejected by federal authorities, then the commission would be required to submit a reapportionment plan to appropriate federal authorities within ninety days of the conclusion of the Legislature's regular session or an adverse ruling by federal authorities.
 
   With regard to compensation, legislators should receive a travel allowance equal to one round trip from home to the State House at a rate equivalent to reimbursement for travel by state employees. Claims for travel allowance should not exceed more than one trip per week during a regular session, special session or obligation to an interim committee. In addition to a travel allowance, legislators should be authorized to establish an annual salary for themselves with three limitations. (1) Legislative salaries could not exceed more than one-half of the Governor's annual salary; however, special provisions should permit salaries of the Speaker and Lieutenant Governor to reach a level equal to ninety percent of the Governor's salary. (2) No increase in legislative salaries could take effect without an intervening legislative election. (3) Per diem expense allowances for legislators should be prohibited or limited to obligations resulting from joint committee meetings. The extensive use of per diem or non-travel allowances creates a slight financial incentive for some legislators to prolong legislative business and to remain in Montgomery for more days during the year than they might if basic compensation was in the form of a salary unconditioned by meeting days. Nevertheless, because of potential tax advantages associated with the current system, many legislators will be reluctant to move away from the complicated arrangement of allowances as a basis for compensation

2. Adopt a constitutional provision which reduces the length of a regular annual session, but grants more flexibility to the Legislature regarding the use of its time during the regular session. This provision would reduce the maximum length of a regular session from 105 to 90 consecutive calendar days, but would also eliminate the restrictive concept of a legislative day. Perhaps citizen legislators would be spending more time in Montgomery during the session, but the regular session would be reduced by approximately two weeks. However, it should be noted that citizen legislators are already required to be in Montgomery for three days per week during a regular session. Under this new provision, with no restraints upon scheduling in the form of a legislative day, each chamber would be able to convene more days for deliberation and debate during a three month period. There would likely be more time for floor debate and discussion, but less time in Montgomery during the year. In the final analysis, this provision is an attempt to make the legislative schedule more compact and compressed for the benefit of citizen legislators.

3. Adopt a constitutional provision which improves accountability and efficiency of the Legislature by repealing the requirement for a B.I.R., by mandating consideration of the major budget bills during the last two weeks of the regular session, and by linking legislative compensation to prioritization of budgets during a regular session. Amendment 448, which requires the B.I.R., should be recognized as a well-intended measure to prioritize the major budget bills, but also as a failure. It serves to consume valuable legislative time and, on occasion in the House, has permitted a minority of at least 40 percent to thwart the will of a majority of less than 60 percent. The measure has not ensured more timely consideration of the budgets and does not impose personal responsibility upon legislators for failure to pass major appropriation bills during the regular session. For these reasons, Amendment 448 should be repealed and replaced with a provision which mandates earlier consideration of budget bills in the regular session and directly links legislative compensation to legislative performance in the realm of budgets.

   This new provision should indicate that the Legislature could transact no business other than the budget bills on the seventy-sixth calendar day of a regular session or thereafter unless the two major budget bills had been submitted to the Governor. Obviously,this provision is a much more stringent mechanism for implementing budget isolation than Amendment 448 with its constantly used loophole, the B.I.R. By implementing budget isolation via this mechanism, perhaps there would be a more timely, more thorough and more prolonged consideration of the major appropriation bills. The current environment encourages legislative leadership to hold budgets until the very end of the session as a form of political leverage on some members, and then to produce budget bills which have not been read and thoroughly digested by members, press and effected constituencies.

   Perhaps more important from the standpoint of legislative accountability, this provision should link legislative compensation to passage of the budget bills during the regular session, since this action by the Legislature has been defined by press and public in recent years as the essence or lowest common denominator of legislative performance. Therefore, travel allowances for members of the Legislature and the Lieutenant Governor should cease immediately and their annual salaries should be prorated if the Legislature adjourned from the regular session without having submitted the General Fund and Alabama Special Education Trust Fund bills to the Governor for approval or rejection. Salary losses should be at a rate of one percent of annual salary for each day after adjournment of the preceding regular session during which the major budget bills were not submitted to the Governor. Legislative compensation should resume only upon passage of these bills by the Legislature. Moreover, under this provision, failure by the Legislature to enact these budget bills would automatically result in a special session with a maximum length of seven calendar days; this special session would commence one week after conclusion of the regular session and the only agenda items for consideration would be the unpassed General Fund and/or ASETF. Under this proposal, members of the Legislature obviously would experience a noticeable reduction in salary for each year when they failed to submit major budget bills to the Governor during the regular session.

4. Adopt a constitutional provision which improves the efficiency of the Legislature by permitting substantially greater use of joint interim committees between regular sessions. This provision would permit joint interim committees of the Legislature to convene between regular sessions, to evaluate bills assigned to them by the Speaker or Lieutenant Governor and to vote on such legislation. Bills approved by joint interim committees would then be postured for a final vote or third reading in both chambers of the state legislature when it convened for the next regular session, provided certain strict, procedural requirements were met.

   Joint interim committees of an equal number of House and Senate members should be created during the organizational session of each quadrennium. Between regular sessions, members of the Legislature would be permitted to file bills with the Secretary of the Senate or Clerk of the House. Within two weeks of its filing, the bill would be assigned by the Speaker for House-sponsored measures and by the Lieutenant Governor for Senate-sponsored measures to a joint interim committee. After the bill had been assigned to a joint interim committee for at least thirty days, the joint committee could meet and vote on the bill, provided there was written notification of the committee's meeting to all members of the Legislature at least ten days in advance of the meeting. This notice must also include the location, date, and time of the meeting, as well as a list of all bills to be considered. Interim committees, which adhere to these procedural requirements, could submit bills to both chambers of the Legislature for a final vote during the regular session, if two-thirds of the members of the joint committee voted favorably for the bill in a roll-call vote at its meeting.

   In this period of E-mail, FAX machines and video-conferencing, the Legislature should strive to increase legislative efficiency by combining these technologies with joint interim committee review and recommendations of legislation prior to a regular session. First readings in the legislative process have become symbolic; members can easily be notified of all pre-filed legislation via computer at their residences and joint interim committee meetings could be broadcast for distribution via cable services. Second readings in the form of considerations by joint interim committees might facilitate more interchamber harmony on legislation than is likely under the current system which necessitates review by a committee in each chamber. The procedural requirements embedded in this proposal would prevent "political blind siding" or "sneak attacks" by political adversaries, and would ensure a review and approval of bills by House and Senate members prior to this expedited review. Since this joint interim work would not be conducted during the routine hustle and bustle of a regular session, the quality of committee evaluation, especially for complex legislation, might be enhanced with a corresponding impact upon legislation. And finally, more legislation of genuine substance would be available for debate and discussion at third reading in both chambers during the initial days of the regular legislative session; there would be less "dead time" during the initial four or five legislative days of a session.

5. Adopt a constitutional provision which fosters more accountability by utilization of new technologies to improve the official record of legislative proceedings. Article IV, section 55 of the 1901 Constitution mandates that each chamber maintain a journal of its proceedings. This requirement has resulted in the printing and distribution of House and Senate journals. Any revision of legislative provisions in the state Constitution should include a requirement for maintenance of an audio and video record of all floor proceedings. Information via these mediums would provide a much improved record for the general public and mass media as they attempt to learn about voting records of legislators, to glean the motivations of legislators, and to assess the overall competency of their solon. Appellate judges and historians who are trying to discern legislative intent of statutory law would also be aided by this new mode of record keeping. Public access to these recordings and duplication privileges should also be protected by this provision in the Constitution.

6. Adopt a constitutional provision which imposes tenure limits upon legislators. Any consideration of constitutional revision about the Alabama Legislature in today's political climate must recognize the public's frustration with so-called "career" legislators. Voters in Alabama and throughout the U.S., perhaps incorrectly, perceive legislators of long tenure as insufficiently responsive to general constituency demands from the district and as excessively receptive to interest group and bureaucratic demands at the state capitol. Legislators of lengthy tenure are viewed by voters as infected with the incurable disease of "political insiderism." In other states, term limits, which previously had been reserved for state executive positions, have been extended to legislators with overwhelming voter approval. Absence of a term limits provision could potentially spell defeat for other needed constitutional reforms regarding the Alabama Legislature, while its presence in a new legislative article might serve as a positive catalyst for voter approval.

   A non-retroactive, term limit provision should permit future members to serve three, four-year terms in the Legislature. A permissible tenure of more than twelve years would not be viewed by the public as sufficiently stringent, while a tenure limit of less than three terms would produce excessive turnover in membership and an absence of adequate institutional memory and continuity. A tenure limit of this length would seem to balance adequately voter demand for mandatory turnover with the institution's operating needs. While advocates of the term limit concept may have oversold its merits, and its adoption may arguably increase, not decrease, the impact of lobbyists and bureaucrats in the lawmaking process, the political feasibility for reform of legislative provisions in the state constitution will not permit evasion of this issue. Given the natural reluctance of incumbent legislators to support term limits, this issue could be the critical threshold or barrier in any movement to acquire legislative proposal of the aforementioned reforms.

Concluding Remarks

   These recommendations, if embedded in a new legislative article for Alabama's Constitution, would operate in tandem to create an improved legislative system. The Legislature would be more accessible to press and public. The Legislature would make more efficient use of a member's time via innovative procedures and new technologies. The Legislature would prioritize appropriation bills in real terms, not symbolic terms. The Legislature would be more representative of a political culture which opposes gradual evolution to a full-time or year-round legislature, and which favors constitutional limits upon tenure and a system of rewards for members based upon performance. Perhaps the enactment of these or similar recommendations would restore the legislative branch of state government to a place of preeminence among the branches of state government, a position which it enjoyed during the formative years of statehood.

   Although the Legislature has made some progress in the previous two decades, primarily in the form of annual sessions, improved facilities and specialized staff for budgeting, more dramatic changes are needed in the state constitution to prepare the Legislature for rationale lawmaking by a citizen legislature in a technologically-driven, Twenty-first Century. The public mood in Alabama and the nation appears conducive for systemic reform. The need for such change in Alabama has been evident for years. The electoral environment for such change is apparently ripe. What will be the response of state leadership?

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Author's Note: Like all current students of Alabama's legislative process and state constitution, the author is especially indebted to the scholarship of Hallie Farmer for her seminal work, The Legislative Process in Alabama (1949), to Malcolm McMillan for Constitutional Development in Alabama,1789-1901: A Study in Politics, the Negro and Sectionalism (1955), and to James Thomas and L. Franklin Blitz for The Alabama Legislature (1974). These works, combined with personal experiences in the legislative arena during the 1980s, constitute the bulk of the author's understanding about "Goat Hill" and Alabama's most fascinating and maligned political institution.

Notes

1. John Kincaid, (ed.). "State Constitutions in a Federal System." The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 496: pp. 13-14.

2. Malcolm C. McMillan. Constitutional Development in Alabama, 1798-1901: A Study in Politics, the Negro, and Sectionalism. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955, pp. 34-38; and Albert B. Moore, History of Alabama. University, Alabama: Alabama Book Store, 1935, p. 102.

3. McMillan, 1955, pp. 50-52.

4. Ibid., p. 55.

5. Mobile Commercial Register, July 13 and 30, 1830.

6. McMillan, 1955, pp. 68-69.

7. Ibid., pp. 84-85; Moore, 1935, pp. 425-426.

8. Advertiser, May 22, 1852.

9. McMillan, 1955, pp. 102-105.

10. John W. DuBose and James K. Greer (ed.) Alabama's Tragic Decade: Ten Years of Alabama, 1865-1874. Birmingham: Webb Book Co., 1940, pp. 113-128; McMillan, 1955: pp. 158-161.

11. William W. Rogers, Robert D. Ward, Leah R. Atkins and Wayne Flynt. Alabama: The History of a Deep South State. Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1994, pp. 245-246.

12. Allen J. Going, Bourbon Democracy in Alabama: 1874-1890. University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1951, pp. 9-26; Moore, 1935, pp. 585-588; Rogers, et al, 1994, pp. 262-263.

13. McMillan, 1955, pp. 195-198.

14. Going, 1951, pp. 23-25; McMillan, 1955, pp. 206-210; Moore, 1935, pp. 502-503; and Rogers, et al, 1994, pp. 265-269.

15. Moore, 1935, pp. 650-656; Rogers, et al, 1994, pp. 345-354.

16. McMillan, 1955, pp. 334-335.

17. Ibid., p. 336; Moore, 1935, pp. 657-658.

18. Hallie Farmer, Hallie. The Legislative Process in Alabama. University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1949, pp. 7-8.

19. Ibid., pp. 202-203. See also 77 Ala. 608 (1884).

20. William H. Stewart, Jr. The Alabama Constitutional Commission: A Pragmatic Approach to Constitutional Revision. University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1975, pp. 33-67.

21. State Legislatures: An Evaluation of Their Effectiveness, 1971.

22. Patrick R. Cotter, James G. Stovall and Samuel H. Fisher III. Disconnected - Public Opinion and Politics in Alabama. Northport, Alabama: Vision Press, 1994, pp. 108-110.

Other References

Brewer, Albert P. and Charles D. Cole. 1992. Alabama Constitutional Law. Birmingham: Samford University. See sections of treatise on pages 451-541 and 570-601.

Citizens Conference on State Legislatures. 1971. Report on an Evaluation of the 50 State Legislatures. Kansas City, Missouri. Reprinted in 1971 by Praeger Publishers.

Constitution of Alabama of 1901. Article IV, sections 44-111, Article IX, and subsequent amendments 1, 12, 58, 39, 57, 339, 341, 375, and 448.

Constitutional Commission of Alabama. 1973. Proposed Constitution of Alabama.

Hackney, Sheldon. 1969. Populism to Progressivism in Alabama. Princeton: Princeton University Press. See chapters nine and ten.

Holloway, William V. and Charles W. Smith, Jr. 1941. Government and Politics in Alabama. University, Alabama: University Supply Store.

Lee, McDowell., H.E. Sterkx and Benjamin B. Williams. 1977. The Role of the Senate in Alabama History. Troy, Alabama: Troy State University Press.

Legislative Reform Study Committee. 1970. Improving the Alabama Legislature.

Moog. v. Randolph. 77 Ala. 608 (1884)

Peddycoart v. City of Birmingham. 354 So.2d 808 (Ala.,1978).

Thomas, James D. 1974. Government in Alabama (Revised Edition), Citizen Information Report No. 13. University, Alabama: Bureau of Public Administration.

Thomas, James D. and L. Franklin Blitz. 1974. The Alabama Legislature, Citizen Information Report No. 11. University, Alabama: Bureau of Public Administration.